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Abstract 
 
 The paper investigates impacts of globalization and corruption-free on the out-
ward foreign direct investment (FDI) for 22 OECD countries. The baseline model 
confirms the positive link of home and host country gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita and Linder’s hypothesis, home and host size of GDP and its similarity, host 
agglomeration of multinational enterprises, common currency euro, and the negative 
link with geographical distance. The results for the effects of globalization and cor-
ruption-free on the outward FDI are mixed. The significant positive association 
pertained to home and host country economic globalization is confirmed, but the 
significant negative association pertained to home and host county social globali-
zation. The significant positive association of outward FDI with the corruption-free 
in host country and the significant negative association with the corruption-free in 
home country and for corruption similarity suggest FDI outflows from low corrup-
tion-free home country to high corruption-free host country. This finding implies 
FDI preference for corruption-free economically globalized OECD host countries. 
 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, globalization measures, corruption measure, 
hypotheses testing 
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Introduction  
 
 Determinants of foreign direct investments (FDIs) vary widely among differ-
ent studies for different countries or group of countries (Bhaumik and Gelb, 2005; 
Bojnec and Fertő, 2014; 2016). Baharumshah and Almasaied (2009), Reiter and 
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Steensma (2010), Lejko and Bojnec (2012), among others, argue that a vast number 
of empirical studies have given mixed results on the relationship between FDI and 
factors promoting economic development and even for the relationship between 
FDI and economic growth by industry structure and performance, technological 
spillovers, and human capital development. Among possible reasons for mixed 
results might be the use of inadequate empirical methods for the use of panel studies 
vis-à-vis cross-sectional studies, the disregard of several factors that are essential for 
understanding the role of FDI in development in terms of country characteristics 
and policies, and the level of corruption (Wu, 2006; Egger and Winner, 2006; 
Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Bitzenes, Tsitouras and Vlschos, 2009; Chang, 2010; 
Peyton and Belasen, 2012; Randrianarisoa et al., 2015). Among such policies are 
price and trade liberalization, privatization and restructuring that have been intro-
duced since the 1990s (Brada, Kutan and Yigit, 2006; Brada, Drabek and Perez, 
2012; Brada and Tomšik, 2009). Brouthers, Gao and McNicol (2008) argued on 
possible trade-offs between different types of FDI: market-seeking, resource- 
-seeking and labour-seeking. Market-seeking FDI aims to directly serve a host 
country market by substituting export with local production and distribution 
(Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Brouthers, Gao and McNicol, 2008). Resource-seeking 
FDI aims to achieve cost-minimization in a host country owing from less costly or 
unavailable resources in the home market. For market-seeking FDI the additional 
corruption costs might be offset by increasing prices in markets that have wealthier, 
less price sensitive customers. On the other hand, the additional corruption’s costs 
might be not easily offset for resource-seeking FDI such labour or materials. While 
corruption might not hinder market-seeking FDI, it might hinder resource-seeking 
FDI and market attractiveness cannot compensate for high corruption costs. 
 The main objective of this paper is to investigate determinants of outward FDI 
at the country levels. More specifically, we focus on the effects of globalization 
and control of corruption on outward FDI flow using panel data for 22 Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-22) countries. Key 
contribution of the paper is on investigation of possible presence of important 
link between globalization and corruption effects and level of FDI outflows. 
Therefore, the paper concentrates on the following two research questions: first, 
does greater globalization of home and host countries also enhances greater out-
ward FDI flows, and second, does a home and host country degree of corruption 
is less or more attractive for outward FDI after controlling for other determinants 
of FDI location? 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next, section 1 presents 
literature review focusing on determinants of outward FDIs in the interaction 
with possible effects of the baseline model explanatory variables, and particularly 
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augmented model with globalization and degree of corruption explanatory varia-
bles. Section 2 describes methodology and data used. Section 3 presents descrip-
tive statistics and correlation analysis. Section 4 presents main econometric results 
in the four steps: for the baseline model specification variables, augmented model 
with globalization and degree of corruption explanatory variables in the home 
country, augmented model with globalization and corruption explanatory varia-
bles in the host country, and augmented model with globalization and degree of 
corruption similarity explanatory variables between the home and host countries. 
Section 5 derives main findings. Finally, last section concludes and provides 
possible directions for research in future. 
 
 
1.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
 Previous research identifies a large set of explanatory variables which may 
be important to explain FDI flows with policy implications (Chakrabarti, 2001; 
Brada and Tomšik, 2009; Blonigen and Piger, 2011; Özkan-Günay, 2011; Eicher, 
Helfman and Lenkoski, 2011; Bojnec and Fertő, 2014; 2016). The model speci-
fication of explanatory variables is usually based on different theoretical frame-
work and prior empirical studies implying uncertainty on model specifications. 
 The gravity models have become popular tool in empirical analysis of inter-
national trade and internationalization modelling (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003), including for modelling of FDI flows (Aggarwal, Kearney and Lucey, 
2012). Within the gravity framework it is expected that outward FDI from home 
country is negatively associated with geographical distance between the home and 
host countries and positively associated with the economic size of the home and 
host countries. The economic size of the country is often measured by the size of 
GDP. Moreover, the GDP similarity is expected to affect the level of FDI flows 
positively (Bergstrand and Egger, 2007).  
 Later studies have introduced some additional trade costs variables to the gra-
vity model including language similarity, having a common border, having a free 
trade agreement or having direct accession to the sea (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). The 
attractiveness for the outward FDI might be the presence of agglomeration of 
multinational enterprises in the host countries. The latter effect for host country 
FDI openness is often proxied by the ratio of inward FDI flows to the size of GDP 
in host country. 
 Finally, the role of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the outward FDI 
is explained by the euro introduction in some of the EU countries (Brouwer, Paap 
and Viaene, 2008). Therefore, we set the following four hypotheses (H), which are 
used to test the validity of the baseline model specification: 
204 
 H1: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with the 
economic size of the home and host country. 
 H2: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with the 
economic size similarity between the home and host country. 
 H3: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with home 
and host countries proximity in common border, language, a common currency, 
and host country openness with agglomeration of multinational enterprises. 
 H4: Outward FDI from home to host country is negatively associated with the 
distance between home and host countries capitals, and landlocked status of home 
country. 
 The usual way for controlling income level of home and host countries as their 
level of economic development includes the GDP per capita measure in the 
baseline model specifications. As relevant control variable in the baseline re-
gression model of the robustness check has been justified Linder hypothesis for 
FDI (Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman, 2015). It is captured by difference 
in log-GDP per capita between home and host country. Therefore, we set the 
following additional two hypotheses (H), which are used to test the validity of the 
baseline model specification: 
 H5: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with the 
level of economic development of the home and host country. 
 H6: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with the 
difference in the level economic development of the home and host country. 
 In addition to these baseline explanatory variables, there is a growing stream of 
research on the role of a variety of globalization indicators and the control of 
corruption as explanatory variables for the complex relationship with the outward 
FDI, which has given mixed results (Lambsdorff, 2003; Mauro, 1995; Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Perez, Brada and Drabek, 2012).  
 While the country’s economic, social and political stability and globalization 
level can have unambiguous effects on the outward FDI they can in association 
with corruption-free enabling environment encourage outward FDI flows from 
home to host country (Desai, 1997; Tulug Ok, 2004; Brada, Kutan and Yigit, 
2006; Nakamura, Olsson and Lonnborg, 2012; Bojnec and Fertő, 2016). However, 
the globalization can have positive effects on economic growth in countries with 
a weak institutions and higher degree of corruption, and vice versa in the others 
(Houston, 2007; Jiménez, 2011). In relations to level of globalization, we set the 
H7 in the following way: 
 H7: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with 
home and host countries globalization. 
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 The theoretical justification of an expected positive link between level of cor-
ruption-free, positive link between corruption-free similarity and unambiguous link 
between globalization and size of FDI outward can be explained by the effects of 
institutional quality on decision making process of a firm (Chang, 2015) and pre-
vious empirical studies focusing specifically on corruption as part of institutional 
setting in home and host countries and globalization aspects of FDI flows. Countries 
with better institutions and corruption-free are more likely to attract more per capita 
FDI than a country with poor institutions and important corruption (Stoian, 2013). 
Corruption increases agency and transactions costs, and erodes the potential value 
of the returns of the opportunity, while the control of corruption and greater trans-
parency might increase the likelihood that prospective entrepreneur or innovator 
might be able to achieve higher levels of entrepreneurial and innovative activity 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Drabek and Warren, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; 
Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Pavel and Rističová, 2015). The degree of corruption 
in home and host countries has been specified as an additional factor among the 
determinants of FDI location. Corruption as paying bribes to corrupt government 
bureaucrats in return for some gains is generally viewed as an additional cost of 
doing business or a tax on profits, which decreases the expected profitability of 
investment projects (Al-Sadig, 2009). The empirical literature on the effects of the 
home and host countries degree of corruption on outward FDI flows has found the 
mixed results of a link between a complex phenomenon of degree of corruption and 
outward FDI flows (Perez, Brada and Drabek, 2012). Corruption might be a con-
sequence of economic and noneconomic variables and thus treated as an endoge-
nous variable. Institutional quality and degree of corruption have been defined 
in different ways. The degree of corruption can negatively affect the costs of 
investment operation and costs of doing business (Mauro, 1995). The relationship 
between degree of corruption and FDI can be of a mixed sign or insignificant in 
a spite of general believe that the degree of corruption is inversely associated with 
per capita FDI flows and that countries with a low degree of corruption attract 
more per capita FDI (Abed and Davoodi, 2000; Akçay, 2001; Al-Sadig, 2009). 
We set the H8 in relation to the degree of corruption-free in the following way: 
 H8: Outward FDI from home to host country is positively associated with 
home and host countries level of corruption-free. 
 As a measure of corruption-free is scaled inversely, a positive sign of associ-
ation between outward FDI from home to host country with the level of corrup-
tion-free is expected: more corruption-free is a country, a greater FDI flows are 
expected. Because we analyse developed OECD countries, we also expect that 
host country corruption-free encourages inward FDIs into host country or outward 
FDI from home to host country. On the other hand, important determinant for FDI 
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flows can be also home and host countries globalization and degree of corruption 
similarity at their different globalization and degree of corruption levels. Habib 
and Zurawicki (2002) suggested that the greater the absolute difference in the 
degree of corruption between the home and host countries, the smaller the FDI 
inflows for the host country. This suggests on the importance of globalization and 
degree of corruption similarity in absolute difference between the globalization 
and degree of corruption in the home and the host countries for bilateral FDI 
flows. Therefore, we set the following H9 and H10: 
 H9: Outward FDI is positively associated with home and host countries level 
of globalization similarity. 
 H10: Outward FDI is positively associated with home and host country degree 
of corruption-free similarity. 
 The degree of corruption might be correlated with other country characteristics 
such as the level of economic development, quality of institutions, lack of com-
petition, and cultural values. On the other hand, the corruption-free similarity 
might also encourage outward FDI in a way that corrupt countries tend to attract 
FDI from other corrupt countries, and less corrupt countries tend to attract FDI 
from less corrupt countries (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; 
Perez, Brada and Drabek, 2012). 
 
 
2.  Methodology and Data  
 
 There is no agreement between scholars how to estimate empirically bilateral 
FDI flows (Sarisoy Guerin, 2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Daude and 
Fratzscher, 2008). Standard approach is the application of gravity type’s model 
(Aggarwal, Kearney and Lucey, 2012). Bergstrand and Egger (2007) provide 
theoretical foundation for the use of gravity model to analyze FDI patterns. In this 
paper we employ the following baseline version of FDI model: 
 
outwardFDIijt = α0 + α1lnGDP/capitait + α2lnGDP/capitajt +   
+ α3lnGDP/capitaijtdifference + α4lnGDPit + α5lnGDPjt + α6lnGDPijtsimilarity +  
+ α7lnOpennessjt + α8lnDistanceij + α9Landlockedi + α10Common borderij +   
+ α11Languageij + α12Euroijt + εijt           (1) 
 
where  
 FDI – level of a bilateral FDI flows between home i and host j countries at time t,  
 GDP  per capitai and GDP per capitaj – level of economic development of home i and 
host j countries,  
 GDPi and GDPj – market size of home i and host j countries,  
 GDP  per capitaij difference – the difference between the ln GDP per capita values for 
home i and host j countries.  
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 The GDP similarity is measured as 
2
i j
i j
GDPGDP
GDP GDP+
 (Bergstrand and Egger, 
2007). The Opennessj measures the agglomeration effect of multinational enter-
prises, which is defined by inward FDI/GDPj in host country j. Trade costs vari-
ables are: Distance for the bilateral distance between partners, and four dummy 
variables including Landlocked if home country i is a land locking country, 
Common border if home and host countries have a common border, Language if 
the common language is used in home and host countries, and Euro if both home 
and host countries are member of Euro area at time t. Finally, εijt is the error term. 
The bilateral FDI data, GDP per capita data and GDP data are expressed in U.S. 
dollars and based on the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics and 
OECD Main Economic Indicators. Trade costs variables are obtained from CEPII 
database. 
 Since our interest focuses on the potential impact of globalization and corrup-
tion-free on outward FDI flows we augment the baseline model in equation (1) 
with proxies for explanatory globalization and corruption-free variables. We 
apply KOF Index of Globalization (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/), which mea-
sures the three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social and political 
(Dreher, 2006). Higher value of indices implies higher level of globalization. 
Finally, to measure of the degree of corruption we use the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) from the Transparency International (Lambsdorff, 2000).  
 The Corruption Perceptions Index as an aggregate indicator compares and 
ranks countries and territories according to their perceived levels of public sector 
corruption <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>. The Corruption Per-
ceptions Index ranges between 10 (highly corruption-free) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 The augmented model for home country i is defined as follows: 
 
outwardFDIijt = α0 + α1lnGDP/capitait + α2lnGDP/capitajt +  
+ α3lnGDP/capitaijtdifference + α4lnGDPit + α5lnGDPjt + α6lnGDPijtsimilarity +  
+ α7lnOpennessjt + α8lnDistanceij + α9Landlockedi + α10Common borderij +  
+ α11Languageij + α12Euroijt + α13Economic Globalizationit + α14Social Globalizationit + 
+ α15Political Globalizationit + α16Corruption-freeit + εijt  (2) 
 
where are added various elements of globalization and corruption-free perception 
indices of home country i. 
 
 In addition, to include various elements of globalization and corruption-free 
perception indices also of host j country, the augmented model specification 
with the host country globalization and corruption-free characteristics is the 
following:  
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outwardFDIijt = α0 + α1lnGDP/capitait + α2lnGDP/capitajt +  
+ α3lnGDP/capitaijtdifference + α4lnGDPit + α5lnGDPjt + α6lnGDPijtsimilarity +  
+ α7lnOpennessjt + α8lnDistanceij + α9Landlockedi + α10Common borderij +  
+ α11Languageij + α12Euroijt + α13Economic Globalizationjt + α14Social Globalizationjt +  
+ α15Political Globalizationjt + α16Corruption-freejt + εijt  (3) 
 
 Finally, the augmented model specification with the home and host countries 
globalization and degree of corruption similarity is specified in the following way:  
 
outwardFDIijt = α0 + α1lnGDP/capitait + α2lnGDP/capitajt +  
+ α3lnGDP/capitaijtdifference + α4lnGDPit + α5lnGDPjt + 6lnGDPijtsimilarity +  
+ α7lnOpennessjt + α8lnDistanceij + α9Landlockedi + α10Common borderij +  
+ α11Languageij + α12Euroijt + α13Economic Globalization Similarityijt +  
+ α14Social Globalization Similarityijt + α15Political Globalization similarityijt +  
+ α16Corruption-free similarityijt + εijt   (4) 
 
 The econometric model is specified with the similarity in the globalization and 
corruption variables by the bilateral pairs of the OECD-22 countries. The glob-
alization and degree of corruption similarity is defined on the basis of the absolute 
difference between the home and host country variables, e.g., separately for three 
different globalization measures and for degree of corruption variable. The com-
putation of the measure of similarity between home and host countries uses 
absolute difference (e.g. Cezar and Escobar, 2015). 
 The data used covers the OECD-22: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Except for Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, 
these are the European Union (EU) OECD countries. Four of them – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – are from Central European Visegrád 
region (Radlo and Sass, 2012). 
 The analysed period is between 2004 and 2008, which partly covers the be-
ginning of the most recent financial and economic crisis. The relative short 
5-years time span turns the analysis into more cross-sectional oriented, rather than 
an investigation of a nature of dynamic underlying processes (e.g. Skabic, 2015; 
Podda, 2016). Due to cross-sectional dependence the baseline and augmented 
models are estimated by the panel-corrected standard error models. 
 
 
3.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis  
 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics of the restricted data-sample for the time- 
-variant and time-invariant specified variables, which are used in the econometric 
analysis. The number of observations (2310 = 462 x 5 years, where 462 = 22 
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countries x 21 variables) is for a balanced panel. In the case of time-invariant 
variables the constant values are taken for each of the analysed years. 
 At the first glance the most considerable differences between the analysed 
OECD-22 countries and over the analysed years are seen from the differential 
between minimum and maximum values for the outward FDI and the measure of 
degree of corruption. Differences between the countries are also in the case of 
GDP per capita as level of economic development and GDP as the size of the 
economy. In addition, a native taught Language similarity between the OECD-22 
countries is lower than the number of Landlocked countries (Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Switzerland) or the Euro coun-
tries. Degree of Social Globalization is a slightly lower than Economic Globali-
zation and lower than Political Globalization. 
 
T a b l e  1 
Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable 
 
Number of  
observations 
Mean value 
 
Std. dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Outward FDIij 2310 1 290.30 5 534.50 –48 323.30 106 849.40 
ln GDP/capitai 2310 10.29 0.41 9.23 11.35 
ln GDP/capitaij difference 2310 0.45 0.36 0.001 1.86 
ln GDPi 2310 5.96 1.07 3.39 7.98 
ln GDP similarityij 2310 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.25 
ln Opennesj 2310 0.44 0.51 –0.47 1.80 
ln Distanceij 2310 7.00 0.66 4.09 8.12 
Landlockedi 2310 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Common borderij 2310 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Languageij 2310 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Euroij 2310 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Economic globalizationi 2310 83.31 8.20 54.25 98.69 
Social globalizationi 2310 82.54 8.37 48.32 94.58 
Political globalizationi 2310 90.98 7.59 60.20 98.43 
Corruption-freei 2310 7.03 1.92 3.02 9.07 
Economic globalization similarityij 2310 9.16 7.50 0.03 38.86 
Social globalization similarityij 2310 8.34 8.76 0.00 44.77 
Political globalization similarityij 2310 7.17 8.16 0.03 37.14 
Corruption-free similarityij 2310 2.25 1.63            0 6.50 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Figure 1 presents the cross-country mean values over 5 years of indices of 
Economic, Social and Political Globalizations, where Globalization indices are 
sort by Economic Globalization indices. The results confirmed differentials be-
tween the analysed OECD-22 countries. The lower value implies lower level of 
globalization. Economic and Social Globalization is the lowest for Turkey. Po-
litical Globalization is on average higher: it is the lowest for the United Kingdom 
and particularly is high for France and Austria. Economic Globalization is the 
highest for Luxembourg and Social Globalization for Switzerland. 
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F i g u r e  1   
The Mean Values of Globalization and Degree of Corruption Perception Indices,  
2004 – 2008 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Higher value of globalization indices and degree of corruption implies higher 
level of globalization and higher degree of corruption-free. None of the analysed 
OECD-22 countries is highly corrupt, but relatively more corruption is identified 
in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Poland and other post-communist analysed OECD 
countries (Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary). This finding is consistent 
with Pavel and Rističová (2015). On the other hand, more corruption-free are for 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. The correlation analysis based from 
a pooled data confirmed modest correlation between the analysed pairs of varia-
bles (Table 2). The partial correlation coefficients are greater or close to 0.5 be-
tween the following pairs of variables: positive correlations between ln GDP per 
capita and degree of Corruption-free, ln GDP of home country and Corruption- 
-free similarity, Economic and Social Globalization, degree of Corruption-free 
and Economic Globalization, degree of Corruption-free and Social Globalization, 
ln GDP per capita and Economic Globalization, ln GDP per capita and Social 
Globalization, Common border and Language; negative correlations between ln 
GDP of home country and its Landlocked status, ln GDP of home country and 
Economic Globalization, ln Distance and Common border, Social Globalization 
of home country and Social Globalization similarity, Political Globalization of 
home country and Political Globalization similarity. 
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4.  Econometric Results 
 
 The econometric results are presented in four steps from baseline model, 
augmented model with globalization and corruption-free regressors for the home 
country, augmented model with globalization and corruption-free regressors for 
the host country, and model with globalization and corruption similarity. 
 
4.1.  Baseline Model 
 
T a b l e  3  
Baseline and Augmented Models for Outward FDIij 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln GDP/capitai     1.190***     1.653***     1.281***     1.030*** 
ln GDP/capitaj     1.052***     1.086***     0.568     0.887*** 
ln GDP/capitaij difference     0.995***     0.893***     1.001***     1.183*** 
ln GDPi     0.670***     0.823***     0.692***     0.705*** 
ln GDPj     0.640***     0.644***     0.789***     0.679*** 
ln GDP similarityij     1.630     2.480*     2.523     3.389** 
ln Opennesj     0.281*     0.303*     0.124     0.307** 
ln Distanceij   –1.394***   –1.322***   –1.352***   –1.249*** 
Common borderij   –0.684*   –0.623*   –0.602*   –0.569 
Languageij     1.020     1.106     1.068     1.043 
Landlocki     0.000   –0.147     0.024     0.021 
Euroij     0.627***     0.501**     0.568***     0.669*** 
Economic globalizationi      0.045***   
Social globalizationi    –0.019*   
Political globalizationi    –0.014   
Corruption-freei    –0.182***   
Economic globalizationj       0.049**  
Social globalizationj     –0.039***  
Political globalizationj     –0.024  
Corruption-freej       0.123***  
Economic globalization similarityij        0.010 
Social globalization similarityij      –0.010 
Political globalization similarityij        0.026 
Corruption similarityij      –0.121*** 
Constant –21.140*** –27.405*** –18.060*** –19.603*** 
N      2 310     2 310     2 310     2 310 
R2      0.109     0.114     0.115     0.113 
Note: Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
Source: Own estimations. 
 
 Regression equation (1) in Table 3 presents the estimated econometric results 
of the baseline model for the outward FDI. The outward FDI is significantly 
positively associated with host and home country GDP per capita as well as with 
their GDP per capita difference. The latter confirmed the validity of Linder hy-
pothesis. The regression coefficients were found to be significantly positively 
associated for the home and host GDPs, but not significant for their GDP simi-
larity. In addition, the regression coefficient is significantly positive for the Euro 
adoption similarity and to a lesser extent for the host country Openness, but not 
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significant for the Language similarity between the pairs of the OECD-22 coun-
tries. On the other hand, the outward FDI were found to be significantly negatively 
associated with the geographical Distance between the capitals in the OECD-22 
countries and to a lesser extent for Common border, but insignificant for the 
Landlocked geographical home country position. These results are consistent with 
the set of H1, H4, H5, H6 and partly H3, but not with the H2. 
 
4.2.  Augmented Model with Globalization and Corruption-free Regressors  
    for the Home Country 
 
 In regression equation (2) in Table 3 the baseline model variables by the signs 
and statistical significance remained rather stable and thus robust in the aug-
mented specified models with the globalization and corruption-free regressors for 
the home country. The regression coefficient for home country GDP per capita is 
higher than for host country GDP per capita and the regression coefficient for 
GDP similarity has become significant at 10% significance level. 
 Regarding host country globalization and corruption-free explanatory varia-
bles, the outward FDI were found to be significantly positively associated with the 
Economic Globalization in the home country and significantly negatively asso-
ciated with the Corruption-free and to a lesser extent with Social Globalization in 
the home country, but statistically not significant with Political Globalization in 
the home country. The greater Economic Globalization in the home OECD-22 
countries, the greater is the outward FDI from home to host OECD-22 countries. 
This latter finding supports the outward FDI flows from more economically 
globalized home to host OECD-22 countries, which is consistent with the set H7. 
On the contrary to our expectations, corruption-free discourages outward FDI 
from home country. 
 
4.3.  Augmented Model with Globalization and Corruption-free Regressors  
    for the Host Country 
 
 When the econometric model is specified for regressors for the globalization 
and corruption-free in the host country in regression equation (3) in Table 3, 
among the baseline model variables a positive association for the GDP per capita 
is found insignificant. Statistically insignificant is also the regression coefficient 
for GDP similarity and the host country Openness, while the Euro adoption ex-
planatory variable is highly significant. 
 Our specific interest is to investigate the globalization and corruption-free 
auxiliary regressors for the host country. The econometric results confirmed that the 
outward FDI was significantly positively associated with Economic Globalization 
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and Corruption-free in the host country, but significantly negatively associated 
with Social Globalization in the host country and insignificant with the Political 
Globalization in the host country. These results are consistent with the H8, but 
only partly confirmed the H7. These results imply that the outward FDI were 
constrained and discouraged by social globalization and likely political globali-
zation in the host country. As expected, economic globalization and corrup-
tion-free in the host country encouraged the outward FDI from the home to the 
host OECD-22 country. 
 
4.4.  Model with Globalization and Corruption Similarity 
 
 As can be seen from equation (4) in Table 3, the baseline model specification 
variables remained consistently robust by the regression coefficients signs and 
their statistical significance: significantly positive sign for home and host country 
GDP per capita and their difference, the size of home and host country GDP and 
their similarity, host country FDI openness and the Euro adoption have signifi-
cantly positive sign, but significantly negative sign for Distance. The regression 
coefficients for Common border and other proximity variables are insignificant. 
 Among the OECD-22 bilateral countries, the outward FDI were not found to 
be significantly correlated with Economic, Social and Political Globalization 
similarities. The regression coefficient that is pertained to Corruption similarity 
was found of a significantly negative sign. These results are inconsistent with the 
set of H9 and H10 as the outward FDI were found either not significant correlated 
or in the case of the Corruption-free similarity significant, but opposite sign. 
 
 
5.  Findings 
 
 The paper has investigated determinants of the outward FDI by using the panel 
corrected standard error model for the OECD-22 countries. The agglomeration 
effect is controlled by the ratio of inward FDI to GDP as economic size of the 
country. 
 The study contributes to the empirical literature analysing potential determi-
nants of outward FDI in developed and developing countries. The paper provides 
evidence of link between globalization, corruption-free and its level of similarity 
among them and outward FDI flows. It confirms the presence of statistically 
significant positive association between economic aspect of globalization in home 
and host country and outward FDI flows on one hand, and between FDI outflows 
from low corruption-free home country to high corruption-free host country. 
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 Among the baseline control variables turned out to be statistically significant 
the positive association sign of the outward FDI with respect to home and host 
country GDP per capita and their difference, home and host country GDP and to 
a lesser extent their similarity, the Euro adoption and the host country openness 
with the inward FDI/GDP ratio, but with a significant negative association sign of 
the outward FDI with respect to the geographical distance between the countries 
capitals and to a lesser extent for Common border. Not significant are found 
regression coefficients for language proximity and being landlocked country. 
 The results and findings on positive associations between home and host 
country GDP per capita and their difference with outward FDI are consistent with 
the theoretical expectations and set hypotheses 5 and 6 and the Linder’s hypoth-
esis. The analysed OECD-22 countries are ranked among the most economically 
developed countries by GDP per capita in the world. 
 Consistent with set hypotheses 1 and 2 is the finding that the economic size in 
home and host countries and their similarity increase the outward FDI owing from 
both supply and demand side factors. On supply side one of modes of interna-
tionalization of enterprises with overall economic growth in home countries are 
their outward FDI, while growth of GDP in host country on demand side provides 
opportunities for a greater presence of inward FDI in GDP in host country owing 
from the increase of the market size. As interesting, the regression coefficients for 
home country GDP are greater than for host country GDP suggesting a crucial role 
of home market size for outward FDI. Consistent with set hypothesis 3 is finding 
that favourable investment climate conditions can be strengthened by host country 
FDI openness with increasing agglomeration of multinational enterprises and the 
Euro adoption, which has simplified financial transactions between their members 
by overcoming the exchange rate risks owing from national banks’ monetary and 
exchange rate policies. 
 A significant negative association between the outward FDI and the geo-
graphical distance between the home and host countries capitals is consistent with 
the theoretical expectations and set hypotheses 4. 
 Our specific focus has been on outward FDI and globalization and corrup-
tion-free variables. They turned out to be statistically significant positive only 
with respect to the home and host country economic globalization and host 
country corruption-free. The bilateral partners’ countries with high level of eco-
nomic globalization have experienced an important role for the FDI flows. The 
analysed OECD-22 countries have created an environment and government policy 
in favour of greater level of economic globalization with easier access for foreign 
investors to enter in more economic sectors and establish operations with remo-
ving restrictions on foreign equity participation and ownership by discriminating 
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against foreign investors in favour of domestic ones. This finding for home and 
host country economic globalization is consistent with the set hypotheses 7. 
 Striking finding is significant positive regression coefficient for host country 
corruption-free and significant negative regression coefficients for home country 
corruption-free and corruption similarity between home and host countries. The 
inverse relation between home country corruption-free and outward FDI suggest 
outflows of FDI from more to less corrupted OECD countries. This finding is also 
supported with significant negative association between corruption similarity 
and the outward FDI. Therefore, the corruption-free in host country with reliable 
institutional framework is found to be an important pull factor for the outward 
FDI flows from less corruption-free home country to more corruption-free host 
OECD-22 bilateral country. This finding for host country corruption-free is con-
sistent with the set hypotheses 8, but not for home country and host country cor-
ruption similarity. This finding suggests that the quality of governance, including 
the control of corruption in host country has played an important factor in 
strengthening the outward FDI across the OECD-22 countries. It is worth men-
tioning that most OECD-22 countries by the degree of corruption-free are ranked 
higher than most other countries in the world. 
 In addition to significant negative association for level of home country cor-
ruption-free, among unexpected results are significant negative associations of 
outward FDI with home and host country social globalization. Home and host 
country political globalization and its similarity are not found significant driver 
for the outward FDI. Further investigation would require counter-intuitive sig-
nificant negative regression coefficients for home and host country social glob-
alization and insignificant regression coefficient for its similarity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The paper contributes to the empirical analysis of relevant determinants of 
outward FDI. The key contribution is to testing hypotheses on either confirm or 
reject presence of important link between corruption and globalization effects and 
level of outward FDI. The results for the baseline model confirmed the positive 
link of home and host country GDP per capita and Linder’s hypothesis, home and 
host country size of GDP and its similarity, host country agglomeration of multi-
national enterprises, common currency euro, and the negative link with geograp-
hical distance. Home and host country economic globalization levels strength-
ened, while home and host country social globalization levels weakened the 
outward FDI flows between the OECD-22 countries. The control of degree of 
corruption in host country has a positive effect on outward FDI from home to host 
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country. This relation is negative in home country and for the similarity in the 
degree of corruption between home and host OECD-22 countries. The empirical 
results suggest FDI outflows from less corruption-free home country to more 
corruption-free host OECD country with clear FDI preference for corruption-free 
economically globalized OECD host countries. 
 Among limitations is the relative short 5-years time span of the analysis and 
decision to use the static cross-sectional oriented panel model rather than dynamic 
panel model setup. Finally, among issues for future research is to study the out-
ward FDI flows in association with the most recent financial and debt crisis and to 
up-date the time dimension of the panel data sample over at least 10 years to allow 
for a time dynamic panel estimation approaches. 
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